In this paper, I compare the extent of Anglo-American judicial engagement in response to civil disobedience with that of the French judiciary. I begin by examining what the civil disobedient can realistically expect to achieve in a court of law. I shall argue that his priority should be to require the judge, acting as a mouthpiece for the law, to respond to his complaints. To do this, the civil disobedient must be able to deny liability for the offence he has (...) allegedly committed by urging a different interpretation of the law on the basis of an alternative -- but plausible -- reading of constitutional or human rights. If the civil disobedient can do this, he can claim a victory of sorts, even if his claims are ultimately unsuccessful. But legal culture can present a further barrier. Judges have different roles in different jurisdictions and therein lie further difficulties for the French civil disobedient. (shrink)

Unmeasured confounding is one of the most important threats to the validity of observational studies. In this paper we scrutinize a recently proposed sensitivity analysis for unmeasured confounding. The analysis requires specification of two parameters, loosely defined as the maximal strength of association that an unmeasured confounder may have with the exposure and with the outcome, respectively. The E-value is defined as the strength of association that the confounder must have with the exposure and the outcome, to fully explain away (...) an observed exposure-outcome association. We derive the feasible region of the sensitivity analysis parameters, and we show that the bounds produced by the sensitivity analysis are not always sharp. We finally establish a region in which the bounds are guaranteed to be sharp, and we discuss the implications of this sharp region for the interpretation of the E-value. We illustrate the theory with a real data example and a simulation. (shrink)

It is well-known that dichotomization can cause bias and loss of efficiency in estimation. One can easily construct examples where adjusting for a dichotomized confounder causes bias in causal estimation. There are additional examples in the literature where adjusting for a dichotomized confounder can be more biased than not adjusting at all. The message is clear, do not dichotomize. What is unclear is if there are scenarios where adjusting for the dichotomized confounder always leads to lower bias than not adjusting. (...) We propose several sets of conditions that characterize scenarios where one should always adjust for the dichotomized confounder to reduce bias. We then highlight scenarios where the decision to adjust should be made more cautiously. To our knowledge, this is the first formal presentation of conditions that give information about when one should and potentially should not adjust for a dichotomized confounder. (shrink)

This article is about recent attempts by scholars, database practitioners, and curators to experiment in theoretically interesting ways with the conceptual design and the building of databases, archives, and other information systems. This article uses the term ‘‘archive’’ as an overarching category to include a diversity of technologies used to inventory objects and knowledge, to commit them to memory and for future use. The category of ‘‘archive’’ might include forms as diverse as the simple spreadsheet, the species inventory, the computerized (...) database, and the museum. Using this protean concept, this study suggests that we are currently witnessing a time where close convergences are occurring between social theory and archive construction. It identifies a ‘‘move’’ toward exposure of the guts of our archives and databases, toward exposing the contingencies, the framing, the reflexivity, and the politics embedded within them. Within this move, the study examines ways in which theories of performance and emergence have begun to influence the way that archives of different kinds are conceived and reflects on the role of Science and Technology Studies scholars in their construction. (shrink)

Political deepfakes have prompted outcry about the diminishing trustworthiness of visual depictions, and the epistemic and political threat this poses. Yet this new technique is being used overwhelmingly to create pornography, raising the question of what, if anything, is wrong with the creation of deepfake pornography. Traditional objections focusing on the sexual abuse of those depicted fail to apply to deepfakes. Other objections—that the use and consumption of pornography harms the viewer or other (non-depicted) individuals—fail to explain the objection that (...) a depicted person might have to the creation of deepfake pornography that utilises images of them. My argument offers such an explanation. It begins by noting that the creation of sexual images requires an act of consent, separate from any consent needed for the acts depicted. Once we have separated these out, we can see that a demand for consent can arise when a sexual image is of us, even when no sexual activity was actually engaged in, as in the case of deepfake pornography. I then demonstrate that there are two ways in which an image can be ‘of us’, both of which can exist in the case of deepfakes. Thus, I argue: if a person, their likeness, or their photograph is used to create pornography, their consent is required. Whenever the person depicted does not consent (or in the case of children, can’t consent), that person is wronged by the creation of deepfake pornography and has a claim against its production. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to study a deeply pre- reflective dimension of our subjective experience. This dimension is gestural and rhythmic, has precise transmodal sensorial submodalities, and seems to play an essential role in the process of emergence of all thought and understanding. In the first part of the article, using examples, we try to draw the attention of the reader to this dimension in his subjective experience. In the second part, we attempt to explain the difficulties and (...) describe the interior process of becoming aware of it. Then we describe the structural characteristics of this dimension, and the different types of 'interior gestures' which enable us to connect ourselves with it. Finally, we formulate a genetic hypothesis about the role of this dimension in cognition, on the basis of which we suggest some research paths in the neuroscientific, educational and existential domains. (shrink)

In recent decades, a new scientific approach to understand, explain, and predict many features of religion has emerged. The cognitive science of religion has amassed research on the forces that shape the tendency for humans to be religious and on what forms belief takes. It suggests that religion, like language or music, naturally emerges in humans with tractable similarities. This new approach has profound implications for how we understand religion, including why it appears so easily, and why people are willing (...) to fight-and die for it. Yet it is not without its critics, and some fear that scholars are explaining the ineffable mystery of religion away, or by showing that religion is natural proves or disproves the existence of God. An Introduction to the Cognitive Science of Religion offers students and general readers an accessible introduction to the approach, providing an overview of key findings and the debates that shape it. The volume includes a glossary of key terms, and each chapter includes suggestions for further thought and further reading as well as chapter summaries highlighting key points. This book is an indispensable resource for introductory courses on religion and a much-needed option for advanced courses. (shrink)

This paper describes a method for analyzing a corpus of descriptions collected through micro-phenomenological interviews. This analysis aims at identifying the structure of the singular experiences which have been described, and in particular their diachronic structure, while unfolding generic experiential structures through an iterative approach. After summarizing the principles of the micro-phenomenological interview, and then describing the process of preparation of the verbatim, the article presents on the one hand, the principles and conceptual devices of the analysis method and on (...) the other hand several dimensions of the analysis process: the modes of structural unfolding of generic structures, the mutual guidance of the processes of structural and experiential unfolding, the tracking of analysis processes, and finally the assessment of analysis results. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans le catalogue E-Cité/Europe, Strasbourg, Apollonia, 2015, p. 26-30. Nous remercions Claire Dehove et WOS-Agences des hypothèses de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. WORKSHOP EN PARTENARIAT AVEC LA HEAR ET LA FACULTÉ DES ARTS DE STRASBOURG – Wos agence des hypothèses/Claire Dehove avec François Duconseille, et avec les étudiants de scénographie HEAR et du Master Critique-essais de Strasbourg, Inès Sassi, Raimonda Tamuleviciute, Ikhyong Park, Laura Perrone, Loue Aveline – - Arts plastiques (...) et autres – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

In this book, Claire Horisk argues that the real problem with so-called offensive jokes-such as racist, sexist, and ethnic jokes-is not that they are offensive but that they are harmful, because they transmit and reinforce stereotypes and ideas that contribute to a network of unjust disadvantage for the derogated group. She distinguishes between belittling jokes, which shore up unjust disadvantage for social groups, and disparaging jokes, which derogate powerful groups such as doctors but do not contribute to unjust disadvantage. (...) She uses philosophy of language and linguistics to argue that both belittling and disparaging jokes communicate ideas by generalized conversational implicature, and to argue that defenses of derogatory remarks as 'just a joke' are inadequate, because jokes can be used to convey what people believe to be true. She focuses on jokes in ordinary conversation, showing that canonical accounts of cooperative conversation need to be enriched: Some people have greater power to shift the common ground of a conversation, and to introduce new presuppositions, than others, and there are alliances that exclude some parties to the conversation, and yet are powerful in setting the future course of the conversation. She also gives a new account of the morality of listening, arguing that sometimes people who listen to derogatory speech may be culpable for doing so. Throughout, she draws on a wealth of interdisciplinary evidence to support the book's claims and to explain why humor is an especially effective means of unjust discrimination. (shrink)

Discerning the Good in the Letters and Sermons of Augustine turns to the vast collection of moral advice found in Augustine's letters and sermons, mining these neglected and highly illuminating texts for examples of Augustine's application of his own moral concepts. It focuses on letters and sermons in which Augustine offers concrete advice on how to interact with the various goods relevant to social and political life. A special set of goods reappears throughout the letters and sermons, namely sexual intimacy (...) and domestic life, power and public office, and wealth and private possessions. Together, these goods form the central topics of this book. Joseph Clair highlights that the most revealing cases are those in which an individual must choose between competing goods, and cases in which an individual's role and role--specific obligations inform their decisions. Such cases uncover the nimbleness of Augustine's moral reasoning in action--an artful blend of scriptural interpretation, virtue theory, and sensitivity to the circumstances of individual lives. He reveals that Augustine's understanding of the goods constitutive of social and political life is deeply indebted to the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrine of oikei=osis, or "social appropriation". The colorful, personal, and practical details found in these writings provide a window onto Augustine's moral reasoning not available in his more theoretical treatments of the good, and the concrete cases often illustrate the human significance of properly discerning the good. Beyond providing one of the first analyses of these ethical writings, this work contributes a new sense of Augustine's ethics--both in terms of the range of questions he addresses and the manner in which he treats them. (shrink)

IntroductionJamais construit, jamais occupé, le Panoptique de Bentham demeure une architecture virtuelle qu’il est possible d’interpréter, de rêver ou de « cauchemarder » avec peut-être plus de liberté que si elle s’était incarnée dans la pierre. Si d’un côté, des recherches récentes ont permis de préciser l’évolution historique de ce projet dans la pensée de Bentham, dans d’autres domaines, le Panoptique est un paradigme utilisé pour lire la littérature anglo-saxonne de la fin du XVIIIe sièc..

Research using the intermodal preferential looking paradigm (IPLP) has consistently shown that English‐learning children aged 2 can associate transitive argument structure with causal events. However, studies using the same methodology investigating 2‐year‐old children’s knowledge of the conjoined agent intransitive and semantic role assignment have reported inconsistent findings. The aim of the present study was to establish at what age English‐learning children have verb‐general knowledge of both transitive and intransitive argument structure using a new method: the forced‐choice pointing paradigm. The results (...) suggest that young 2‐year‐olds can associate transitive structures with causal (or externally caused) events and can use transitive structure to assign agent and patient roles correctly. However, the children were unable to associate the conjoined agent intransitive with noncausal events until aged 3;4. The results confirm the pattern from previous IPLP studies and indicate that children may develop the ability to comprehend different aspects of argument structure at different ages. The implications for theories of language acquisition and the nature of the language acquisition mechanism are discussed. (shrink)

Automated Influence is the use of Artificial Intelligence to collect, integrate, and analyse people’s data in order to deliver targeted interventions that shape their behaviour. We consider three central objections against Automated Influence, focusing on privacy, exploitation, and manipulation, showing in each case how a structural version of that objection has more purchase than its interactional counterpart. By rejecting the interactional focus of “AI Ethics” in favour of a more structural, political philosophy of AI, we show that the real problem (...) with Automated Influence is the crisis of legitimacy that it precipitates. (shrink)

The Enkratic Principle enjoys something of a protected status as a requirement of rationality. I argue that this status is undeserved, at least in the epistemic domain. Compliance with the principle should not be thought of as a requirement of epistemic rationality, but rather as defeasible indication of epistemic blamelessness. To show this, I present the Puzzle of Inconsistent Requirements, and argue that the best way to solve it is to distinguish two kinds of epistemic evaluation – requirement evaluations and (...) appraisal evaluations. This allows us to solve the puzzle while accommodating traditional motivations for thinking of the Enkratic Principle as a requirement of rationality. (shrink)

Given the enduring debate over what constitutes quality, and therefore appropriate training, in clinical ethics consultation, it is unsurprising that there is variation in the structure and content of clinical ethics fellowship programs. However, this variation raises questions about the value of fellowship training when the ethicists that emerge from these programs might be quite different. The specifics of fellowship programs are largely internal. As such, the extent of variation and whether such variation is problematic remains unclear. In this article, (...) we summarize lessons learned from discussions between fellows, their mentors and program directors at the 2020 Clinical Ethics UnConference, and outline some possible ways to advance the conversation about variation in fellowship programs and training. We argue for the more open sharing of training specifics in order to help break down the siloed nature of fellowship programs. Greater transparency could, firstly, allow for more robust reflection on and refinement of training practices and, secondly, allow us to better balance professionally appropriate consistency with unavoidable or desirable variation based on local norms, culture and leadership. (shrink)

A recent article argued for the immorality of abortion regardless of personhood status by comparing the impairment caused by fetal alcohol syndrome to the impairment caused by abortion. I argue that two of the premises in this argument fail and that, as such, one cannot reasonably attribute moral harms to abortion on the basis of the moral harms caused by fetal alcohol syndrome. The impairment argument relies on an inconsistent instantiation, which undermines the claim that personhood is irrelevant, and it (...) does not fulfill its own ceteris paribus clause, which demands that no additional benefit be gained from abortion that would not be gained from causing fetal alcohol syndrome. (shrink)

This is a slightly edited version of a talk given by Mrs Claire Rayner, a journalist and broadcaster, to a conference on human sexuality held under the auspices of the London Medical Group in the spring of this year. Mrs Rayner's lively presentation conveys the problems and anxieties which people face in this area, even in this so-called `permissive' age.

I argue that there are some situations in which it is praiseworthy to be motivated only by moral rightness de dicto, even if this results in wrongdoing. I consider a set of cases that are challenging for views that dispute this, prioritising concern for what is morally important in moral evaluation. In these cases, the agent is not concerned about what is morally important, does the wrong thing, but nevertheless seems praiseworthy rather than blameworthy. I argue that the views under (...) discussion cannot accommodate this, and should be amended to recognise that it is often praiseworthy to be motivated to do what is right. (shrink)

Challenging previous interpretations of Levinas that gloss over his use of the feminine or show how he overlooks questions raised by feminists, Claire Elise Katz explores the powerful and productive links between the feminine and religion in Levinas’s work. Rather than viewing the feminine as a metaphor with no significance for women or as a means to reinforce traditional stereotypes, Katz goes beyond questions of sexual difference to reach a more profound understanding of the role of the feminine in (...) Levinas’s conception of ethical responsibility. She combines feminist interpretations of Levinas with interpretations that focus on his Jewish writings to reveal that the feminine provides an important bridge between his philosophy and his Judaism. Katz’s reading of Levinas’s conception of the feminine against the backdrop of discussions of women of the Hebrew bible points to important shifts in contemporary philosophy toward the creation of life and care for the other. (shrink)

L’enfant exposé aux violences conjugales est encore trop peu considéré comme victime directe de ces violences, malgré les études réalisées en France et en Amérique du Nord. Les auteures ont mené une recherche qualitative clinique auprès de huit enfants témoins de violences conjugales durant leur petite enfance, accueillis avec leur mère dans deux structures dédiées, afin d’étudier leur fonctionnement psychique en leur proposant le test projectif du Patte-Noire. L’intérêt de cette étude réside dans le fait de recueillir la parole de (...) l’enfant, alors que les recherches internationales sont souvent basées sur des questionnaires adressés à la mère. Les résultats révèlent l’intériorisation précoce de modalités relationnelles violentes et pointent l’importance d’un accompagnement sur le versant psychologique de l’enfant et du (des) parent(s). (shrink)

Can we make mistakes about what rationality requires? A natural answer is that we can, since it is a platitude that rational belief does not require truth; it is possible for a belief to be rational and mistaken, and this holds for any subject matter at all. However, the platitude causes trouble when applied to rationality itself. The possibility of rational mistakes about what rationality requires generates a puzzle. When combined with two further plausible claims – the enkratic principle, and (...) the claim that rational requirements apply universally – we get the result that rationality generates inconsistent requirements. One popular and attractive solution to the puzzle denies that it is possible to make rational mistakes about what rationality requires. I show why (contra Titelbaum (2015b), and Littlejohn (2015)) this solution is doomed to fail. (shrink)

Constraining collective cell migration in vitro using different types of engineered substrates such as microstructured surfaces or adhesive patterns of different shapes and sizes often leads to the emergence of specific patterns of motion. Recently, analogies between the behavior of cellular assemblies and that of active fluids have enabled significant advances in our understanding of collective cell migration; however, the physiological relevance and potential functional consequences of the resulting migration patterns remain elusive. Here we describe the different patterns of collective (...) cell migration that have been reported in vitro in response to geometrical constraints, explore the in vivo pertinence of the in vitro systems used to impose the geometrical constraints, and discuss the potential physiological ramifications of the collective migration patterns that emerge as a result of physical constraints. We conclude by highlighting key upcoming challenges in the exciting field of constrained collective cell migration. (shrink)

‘Antony Gormley’, Royal Academy of Arts, 21 September–3 December 2019.

Recent studies in neuroeducation highlight the benefits of teaching children about how the brain works. However, very little is known about children's naive conceptions about the brain. The current study examined these representations, by asking 6–10 year-old children and adults to draw a brain and the inside of a belly as a control drawing. The drawings were scored using a content analysis and a list of graphic indicators was derived. First, all the graphic indicators used in the brain drawings were (...) different from those used in the belly drawings, suggesting that children are able to distinguish these two organs. Second, with age, children depict an increasing number of indicators, more complex indicators, indicators that are more anatomically correct, to depict the brain. There is an important evolution between 6 and 8 years-old but also between 10 years-old and adults. These results are discussed in relation to children's metacognitive knowledge and to their implications for neuroeducation. (shrink)

Biological and epidemiological phenomena are often measured with error or imperfectly captured in data. When the true state of this imperfect measure is a confounder of an outcome exposure relationship of interest, it was previously widely believed that adjustment for the mismeasured observed variables provides a less biased estimate of the true average causal effect than not adjusting. However, this is not always the case and depends on both the nature of the measurement and confounding. We describe two sets of (...) conditions under which adjusting for a non-deferentially mismeasured proxy comes closer to the unidentifiable true average causal effect than the unadjusted or crude estimate. The first set of conditions apply when the exposure is discrete or continuous and the confounder is ordinal, and the expectation of the outcome is monotonic in the confounder for both treatment levels contrasted. The second set of conditions apply when the exposure and the confounder are categorical. In all settings, the mismeasurement must be non-differential, as differential mismeasurement, particularly an unknown pattern, can cause unpredictable results. (shrink)

Unmeasured confounding is an important threat to the validity of observational studies. A common way to deal with unmeasured confounding is to compute bounds for the causal effect of interest, that is, a range of values that is guaranteed to include the true effect, given the observed data. Recently, bounds have been proposed that are based on sensitivity parameters, which quantify the degree of unmeasured confounding on the risk ratio scale. These bounds can be used to compute an E-value, that (...) is, the degree of confounding required to explain away an observed association, on the risk ratio scale. We complement and extend this previous work by deriving analogous bounds, based on sensitivity parameters on the risk difference scale. We show that our bounds can also be used to compute an E-value, on the risk difference scale. We compare our novel bounds with previous bounds through a real data example and a simulation study. (shrink)

Despite their growing popularity, little is known about the psychological effects of participating in past-life meditation groups in contemporary western contexts. We conducted a study to re-create some of the conditions observed in the field by facilitating a group of adults interested in exploring past life meditation. Before the session, participants completed a survey about their afterlife beliefs and associated experiences. Participants also completed questionnaires measuring meaningfulness in life and fear of death before and after the session. In the sample (...) (n = 125), just over half of the participants (52%) reported having a past life memory or vision during the session. Higher paranormal beliefs predicted reporting a past life memory or vision. We also found that having prior memories or visions of having lived before, but not the general belief in having a past life, predicted reporting having past life experiences during the session. Consistent with our predictions, participants who reported having a past life memory or vision also reported reduced existential death distress and increased meaningfulness in life following the session, compared to those who did not report these experiences. (shrink)

Success conditions on theoretical understanding are notoriously difficult to pin down. Yet epistemologists broadly agree that there is a grasping condition on understanding and that this condition distinguishes understanding from propositional knowledge. Currently, representation manipulability is the most common expression of this condition. In this paper, I argue that representation manipulability is only a surface-level condition on the highest form of grasping. I propose that grasping a theory admits at least three levels: theory formation, theory comprehension, and theory competence. I (...) argue that the highest level, which I call ‘theory competence,’ corresponds to representation manipulability and imposes the following necessary conditions on an individual’s representation: (a) it is well-integrated into a theory, (b) it is encoded into the individual's long-term memory, and (c) it regulates the individual's occurrent thinking by being easily retrievable and by dispositionally attuning the individual to features of the object and the theory that are contextually relevant. When an individual meets these conditions, they can manipulate their representation in the way epistemologists often argue they must if they understand. (shrink)